The week leading up to the MLB trade deadline is a tumultuous time for GMs and their staffs. You are inundated with messages and phone calls. Constantly communicate with other GMs and gather potential deals with your executive office. Most teams work on four to five transactions at a time. There is no sleep, no rest for the mind, the clock is ticking, and if you can’t close deals to improve your organization, you’ve failed at your job. At the deadline, the GM is just as important to a club as the star player. My favorite trade deadline was with the Reds in 1995 when we swept the Dodgers in the Division Series before falling to the Braves in the NLCS. We acquired three starters and a Gold Glove outfielder in two trades 10 days apart. The first deal was an eight-player trade with the Giants that landed shortstops Mark Portuguese and David Berba and center fielder Darren Lewis. The second deal sent left-hander CJ Nitkowski and a player to be named to the Tigers for left-hander David Wells. Those trades propelled the Reds to a first place finish in the NL Central, winning the division over the Astros by nine games. I think 1998 was my best selling year at the trade deadline. Reds ownership told me to cut payroll during a disappointing season. I traded Jeff Shaw, the previous year’s Rolaids Relief Man Award winner, for first baseman Paul Konerko and lefty Dennys Reyes. The Reds finished 77-85 in ’98, but won 96 games the following year. I traded Konerko for Mike Cameron in November 1998. In 2000, I traded Cameron as part of a package for future Hall of Famer Ken Griffey Jr. None of these trades would have happened if the Reds weren’t prepared to be sellers at the ’98 deadline. It’s a great reminder: Planning an organization for trades starts well before the end of July. Baseball is always changing and the role of the GM has evolved significantly since I last held the title. But some things have not changed. Here’s what the trade season is like if you’re sitting in the GM’s chair. Reds GM Jim Bowden, left, talks with manager Bob Boone in 2002. (Larry Goren/Four Seam Images/Associated Press)

Management until ownership

They are the owner’s team and the GM works for them, just like the relationship between a player and his agent. Some owners are more considerate than others. In any case, it is imperative that the GM and the owner are on the same page. A collaborative approach is the best way to do business. However, it is sometimes more difficult to reach an agreement with ownership than with a rival GM. For example, when I was GM of the Reds in the mid-90s, I once worked out a deal for a trade involving first baseman Hal Morris, pending owner approval. Then-owner Marge Schott vetoed the deal because of her relationship with Morris’ wife at the time, Megan. I explained to Schott that I wasn’t trading Megan and that they could remain friends, but after two days of trying to convince her, I had to accept that I wasn’t allowed to make the deal. Then there was a near-deal for Phillies third baseman Scott Rolen in 2002 that would have sent Brandon Larson in the 1997 first round to Philadelphia. That deal was scrapped by Reds president John Allen for financial reasons. I then tried to sell A-ball prospects to raise the necessary funds, but even after making up the financial difference, I couldn’t get approved. On the other hand, in 1995 when I acquired Wells from the Tigers, we were way over budget, but after two days of persuasion, Schott gave me the go-ahead to make this major deal. Making deals isn’t just about negotiating with the other team. Sometimes convincing your own house is the hardest part of closing a deal.

Get ready

Preparation starts with self-scouting your players. GMs must ensure that the organization has evaluated its players at all levels in a fair and unbiased manner. All too often, organizations “overvalue” their players, which makes it harder for those teams to complete trades. Knowing what you have and valuing players correctly is imperative in this industry. In that regard, knowing your 17-year-old pitcher in A-ball is just as important as knowing the veteran All-Star on your major league roster. For example, as GM of the Reds, I acquired right-handed pitcher Juan Guzmán in a trade with the Orioles for lefty reliever BJ Ryan and 17-year-old righty Jacobo Sequea on July 31, 1999. Guzmán would go 6-3 with a 3.03 ERA in 12 starts for Cincinnati and helped the Reds finish with 96 wins that year. Ryan went on to have a solid career with the Orioles and Blue Jays, but at the time, the trade fell through for Sequea, a player the Orioles really wanted. We knew our players well and didn’t think he was a prospect. And as it turned out, Sequea never made it to the big leagues. Another example of the importance of self-scouting was when I traded outfielder Roberto Kelly to the Braves for Deion Sanders in May 1994. The Braves would not make the trade unless the Reds included a Low-A or Rookie-ball pitch. We exchanged names for hours before they asked for Roger Etheridge, a left-winger who had a numbered banner. Our top evaluators and I had spent a lot of time watching Etheridge and thought he lacked deception and command. We quickly put him in the deal because we didn’t think he would make it to the big leagues. He never did. Another crucial part of the preparation is the evaluation of the players of the other 29 teams. This includes knowing players’ physical tools, intelligence, makeup, character, performance and current production, as well as projecting their future production. When I was with the Reds in 1997, we made sure minor league right-handed reliever Danny Graves was included in the John Smiley trade with Cleveland based on the recommendation of one of our top evaluators, Jack McKeon. Many of the scouting reports on Graves were not glowing and indicated an average fastball with a sink. However, McKeon loved his competitiveness, intangibles and that he wasn’t afraid to play inside and go right at players. Graves finished with 182 career saves and made two All-Star teams. He had a 5.54 ERA and lower scouting grades when we traded for him. Great scouting by McKeon made this trade happen for the Reds. Finally, work needs to be done to find trades. Transactions need to work for both groups, so understanding the needs and wants of other organizations is imperative. I had a white board with trading deadline targets on my desk. He listed all the other teams and players we had targeted in their organizations, from champions to rookie-ball kids. I also listed all the players from our organization that opposing teams had shown interest in. This helped highlight the groups we could best match the bids with.

Relationships matter

GMs can trade with only 29 other teams, so it’s important to build a professional and personal relationship with each of your front-office counterparts. These are the people you need to work with to improve your organization outside of free agency, waivers or drafts. Every GM has their own negotiating style. Some like constant communication, others prefer occasional check-ins. Some ask for too much and take their time to reduce the demands. others are straightforward and tell you exactly what they will and won’t do in a deal. Understanding the individual style and process of all other GMs is vital. For example, Dave Dombrowski of the Phillies and Brian Cashman of the Yankees are “straight shooters” who get straight to the point. They are transparent and say what they want to do or what they are willing to do. When a deal is close, they know how to close it and often do so because of their direct communication style. Theo Epstein, formerly of the Red Sox and Cubs, and I did the first transaction strictly via email, and he and I were comfortable communicating in a variety of ways. In contrast, Walt Jocketty of the Cardinals, for example, preferred in-person phone conversations, even when text and email were commonplace. It doesn’t matter the method. As a GM, you just want to make sure you know your bond preferences and adjust accordingly to give yourself the best chance of landing a deal.

It takes a whole organization

Many departments in an organization contribute to the entire trade process. Seamless coordination and communication are essential. Player development must answer key questions when acquiring prospects: Can we improve the players we trade for? This could include a swing change, an adjustment to a delivery, or just a new approach. Also, what level should we assign them to? Then there is the analytics department, whose insights can support or present counter-arguments to the scouting department’s recommendations. The research, development, science and technology department uses science and new technologies to further improve evaluation processes and gain competitive advantage. For example, R&D teams, working with the analytics department, have recently helped teams change pitchers’ repertoires and usages, leading to improved performance and increased pitcher value. When an organization is considering a trade for a pitcher, R&D might pitch the acquisition and suggest something like this: If we increase breaking ball usage by 20 percent and correspondingly decrease his fastball…