The 19th century military theorist Karl von Clausewitz, in saying that war was the continuation of politics by other means, implied that the active war phase of a conflict was simply a period of violent activity that changed the situation on the ground before negotiations resumed. With the obvious exception of World War II, most modern conflicts have ended in negotiations rather than outright victory on the battlefield. Ukraine will almost certainly follow this pattern. Any hope Vladimir Putin had of a quick victory collapsed amid the extraordinary ineptitude of his army’s failed assault on Kyiv in the first days of the war. Before February 24th, while massing his intimidating and menacing forces on the Ukrainian border, Putin was the world leader at whose door other leaders in the West wanted to cross a path. While threatening, he was in an extremely powerful position, but having launched his utterly incompetent “special military operation”, he became an outcast with credible charges of genocide soiling his hands. If Putin’s aggressive stance before February 24 was designed to divide the West, it failed in that strategic goal, just as the early operational failure of the armed forces gave him initial success on the ground in Ukraine. However, in his determination to redefine the borders of Eastern Europe, the Russian president has ensured that the second stage of his campaign has shifted to more achievable operational goals – namely, securing a land corridor between Crimea and Russia itself and seizing of the two Donbass. Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. On the battlefield, the Russian military has turned to tactics more reminiscent of the Soviet-era Red Army: massive and sustained artillery and cruise missile attacks on nearby targets to reduce Ukrainian defensive positions and on deep targets to undermine morale the citizens. These had mixed results. Applying relentless pressure, the Russians have ground their bloody way through most of the two Donbas provinces and secured the land corridor from Crimea. But this has a huge human cost. Reliable sources say that the Russian army may have lost around 40,000 in action, and many times that number were wounded, missing or captured. Such losses are unsustainable by armed forces, especially those not fully mobilized on a war footing (Putin remains reluctant to admit that he is actually waging war). At home, pressure from soldiers’ mothers is mounting, reminiscent of the conflict in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. And in Ukraine, the supply of Western arms and ammunition is turning the tide of success toward the defenders, encouraging even limited counterattacks such as recently in the Kherson region . But back to the interim review, do these developments suggest a win-win for both sides? The provisional conclusion must be negative. The Russians are approaching a tipping point when, if they manage to complete their takeover of the Donbass, they will be exhausted and unable to push further west, while the Ukrainians, bolstered with western weapons and training, will be able to hold new defense lines in the east of their country. As winter approaches, the conflict on the ground looks set to come to a deep freeze-like stalemate. Away from the battlefield, other strategic influences are at play. The rupture of diplomatic relations with the West, the reticence of China and India, and the ambivalence of most African states leave Putin in a very isolated position on the world stage. However, at the same time, the economic picture appears to be moving in Putin’s favor. Sanctions may have a negative impact on the Russian economy, but the ruble is strong and revenues from continued energy supplies to the West sustain the Russian war machine. In addition, reduced supplies, particularly of oil, to the West are being eagerly bought by the East Asian market. And now, as winter approaches, energy-hungry countries such as Germany, Austria and Italy struggling to diversify their energy supply may begin to break away from the West’s current cohesion, giving Putin a taste from achieving this strategic objective. dividing NATO. In addition, international pressure orchestrated by the United Nations to restart the flow of Ukrainian grain exports to avoid a food crisis in developing countries has brought Russia and Ukraine to an abysmal agreement on this issue. The rancor underscored by this week’s shelling of the Odessa grain port. The gathering of military, diplomatic and economic factors leads to the possible conclusion that the Clausewitzian moment for the resumption of negotiations may have arrived. The UK is leading the West in agreeing with President Zelensky that the situation on the ground should return to that of February 24 and possibly that Crimea should be returned to Ukraine – but that will not happen. The Russians will not withdraw voluntarily, the Ukrainians are highly unlikely to be strong enough to throw them out, and the West will never consider an Iraq-style operation to drive them out. Vladimir Putin will continue to sit tight under his nuclear umbrella, and Volodymyr Zelensky may have to accept that about 20 percent of sovereign Ukrainian territory is under Russian occupation. This is the changed situation in which negotiations are likely to resume, but, crucially, it must be Zelensky himself who decides to negotiate and not because of Western pressure to do so. The West should continue to support Ukraine and not start dictating to it, even though some European countries would like to see this war end sooner rather than later for their own economic and energy reasons. By now, it should be clear that the interim conclusion of this review looks more like a hard-fought draw than a win or loss for either side. Even if the situation in Ukraine is likely to remain deeply unsatisfactory for that country, Putin’s aggression should not be considered a success. NATO’s future posture must be determined to deter Russian aggression as it was during the Cold War, but this comes at an obvious and unavoidable cost: defense spending will have to increase. Member states will make their own decisions on this front, and in the UK, it is now a live issue in the context of the Conservative leadership election. Boris Johnson has pledged to increase our defense spending from 2 per cent to 2.5 per cent of GDP by the end of the decade. Now Liz Truss has pledged to raise it to 3 per cent. So it’s no surprise that Defense Secretary Ben Wallace, popular among the party faithful for his handling of the Ukraine crisis, this week declared his support for her campaign. Ukraine is fighting for our values at a huge cost in blood and treasure. The least we can do is dig deeper into our pockets to honor that commitment and sacrifice. General Lord Dannatt was Chief of the General Staff from 2006 to 2009
